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Case Notes /

Contracts-Breach-Action

for Damages When

Death Results from Breach of Contract. Zostautas v. St. Anthony De
PaduaHospital, 123 Ill., 2d 326, 178 N.E. 2d 303 (1961).

AN ACTION WAS BROUGHT BY THE PARENTS of a five year old boy to recover damages

arising out of the breach of an express contract to perform a tonsilectomy which resulted in the child's death. In the circuit court the surgeon, anesthetist, hospital and
nurse were joined as defendants in a complaint containing six counts, setting forth
claims under the wrongful death statute and breach of contract.
The circuit court dismissed the fourth count against the defendant surgeon which
alleged breach of contract. The plaintiff appealed, held, that a common law contract
action does not lie when death resulted from the breach of a contract expressed or
implied, to perform an operation. Zostautas v. St. Anthony De Padua Hospital, 123
Ill., 2d 326, 178 N.E. 2d 303 (1961). The court did say, however, that while the breach
of contract action could not be enforced, there could be liability under the Illinois
Wrongful Death Act.
A similar result, although based on entirely different facts, was reached in the much
commented case of Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, 9 N.Y. 2d 34, 211 N.Y.S. 2d 133, 172
N.E. 2d 526 (1961); 10 CATHOLIC U. L. REV. 88 (1961) ; 74 HARV. L. REV. 1652 (1961);

49 GEO. L. J. 768 (1961) ; 49 CALIF. L. REV. 187 (1961) . There the plaintiff's intestate,
before boarding a plane in New York, bought a ticket for transportation to Massachusettsand that defendant, by causing his death in the crash, breached its contract to carry
him safely. As a result, the passenger's estate and his dependents suffered substantial
damage for which his administrator sued and which included "loss of accumulations
of prospective earnings of the deceased." The court did not allow recovery on the
breach of contract action. It stated that relief, if any, may be obtained only upon
proof of defendant's negligence under a wrongful death act.
Presumably in both Zostautas and Kilberg, counsel for the petitioner thought that
either their action would not lie under the wrongful death act or that the amount of
recovery under the traditionally applicable wrongful death act would be unjust. In
Zostautas, the court for the first time interpreted the fact situation presented as con-
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stituting a "default" within the terms of the Illinois Wrongful Death Act (supra at

307).
In Kilberg, if the New York court were to follow the traditional view, it would have
applied the whole Massachusetts Wrongful Death Act with its $15,000 limitation of
liability. Petitioner would have preferred to have had the unlimited liability set by
the New York Wrongful Death Act.
Today the law seems dear that an action for damages will not lie when death
results from a breach of contract. In actions based on contract, liability is predicated
on the failure to perform an agreed undertaking rather than upon negligence.
Damages are usually restricted to the payments made, the expenditure for nurses and
medicines, or "other damages that flow naturally from the breach thereof." Conklin
v. Draper, 229 App. Div. 227, 241 N.Y.S. 534 (1930). They do not include the
patient's pain and suffering as in malpractice actions. Robins v. Finestone, 308 N.Y.
543, 127 N.E. 2d 330 (1955). It is generally held that a contract action can be main-

tained when the patient survives; however the law seems to be a maze of conflicting
decisions and rationalizations in actions where the patient has died as in the
Zostautas case.
The authority regularly cited for the proposition that damages are not recoverable
for wrongful death is Baker v. Bolton, 1 Camp. 493, 170 Eng. Rep. 1033 (1808), in
which Lord Ellenborough without referring to authority, said: "In a civil court, the
death of a human being could not be complained of as an injury." The case has been
widely criticized as "embodying a careless overstatement of the law without any
supporting authority and induced by confusion of thought," 13 VAND. L. REV. 605
at 613, see also Osborn v. Gillett, L.R. 8 Ex. 88, at 96 (1873) ; 3 HOLDSWORTH, A
(3d ed. 1923).
Most early English cases followed the Baker case with a few exceptions. Jackson v.
Watson, 2 K.B. 193 (1909); Bradshaw v. Lancashireand Yorkshire Ry., L.R. 10 C.P.
189 (1875). In the Jackson case a husband brought an action for breach of implied
warranty on canned food which resulted in the death of his wife. The damages sought
were for the loss of his wife's services after her death along with medical and funeral
expenses. The court reasoned that the rule in Baker v. Bolton had no application to
an action for breach of warranty since it was independent of the wrong, and the
death of the wife was only an element in ascertaining damages and not an essential
part of the action.
In the United States, early case law was contrary to that of the English. The courts
allowed recovery resulting from wrongful deaths. Sullivan v. Union Pac. R.R., 23
Fed. Cas. 368 (No. 13599) (C.C. Neb. 1874); Cross v. Guthery, 2 Root 90 (Conn.
1794) where the action could be framed ex contractu. However these early cases were
discredited, Mobile Life Insurance Co. v. Brame, 95 U.S. 754 (1877), or ignored,
Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. New York and N.H.R.R., 25 Conn. 265 (1865),
and the trend began reversing itself in both state and federal courts until they
generally agreed in the broad proposition that "at common law, no civil action could
be maintained for the death of a human being, caused by the wrongful act or negligence of another, or for any damages suffered by any person in consequence of
such death." Hyatt v. Adams, 16 Mich. 185 (1848), 13 VAND. L. REv. 616, n. 55 (1960).
Some courts have abandoned the common law principal "actio personalis moritur
HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW
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cum persona" (a personal action dies with the person) in contract actions of this
nature and have taken a more practical approach. They point out the impossibility
of calculating the pecuniary value of a life as the reason for denying recovery in
wrongful death cases. Van Beeck v. Sabine Towing Co., 300 U.S. 342, 344-45 (1937) ;
Van Amburg v. Vicksburg, S. & P. R.R., 37 La. Ann. 650, 651 (1885). Many writers
on jurisprudence reason that because of the awful magnitude of the wrong, neither
courts nor juries have been entrusted by the law with the function of estimating it.
Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. New York & N.H.R.R., 25 Conn. 265, 273 (1856).
Courts using this as a basis for the rule were in effect declaring that "because the compensation cannot be adequate there shall be no compensation at all." POLLOCK,
TORTS 66 (9th ed. 1912).
In the words of Chief Justice Stone, "for every breach of a contract made on good
consideration the law awards some damage." Hagen v. Riley, 13 Gray. 515 (1859).
The damages available for breach of contract generally fall into two classes, either
compensatory (direct and consequential) or nominal. Death being the direct result
of the breach of contract, a value would have to be placed on life itself to adequately
compensate those entitled to bring the action. The difficulty of doing this need not
rule out recovery for compensatory damages. Such damages are those which may fairly
and reasonably supposed to have been in the contemplation of both parties at the
time they made the contract, as the probable result of its breach. See RESTATEMENT,
CONTRACTS § 330 (1932) ; Duncan v. St. Luke's Hospital,98 N.Y.S. 867, 871, 113 App.
Div. 68 (1906). In the Zostautas case the loss to the parents, if the child died, could
have reasonably been contemplated by the surgeon. This loss could take the form of
deprivation of love and affection due the parents, funeral expenses, or the son's contribution to the family income. Nominal damages, by definition also apply to cases
of this nature.
Many judges wishing to retain the established rule of law, but being unsatisfied
with the historical basis for the rule, have sought justification on moral grounds. This
is shown by a Michigan court speaking through Judge Christiancy in the Hyatt case
when he said, "To the cultivated and enlightened mind, looking at human life in the
light of the Christian religion as sacred, the idea of compensating its loss in money is
revolting." Hyatt v. Adams, supra at 191.
A Massachusetts court, faced with a fact situation very similar to the one confronting the Illinois court in the Zostautas case, held that a husband could not recover for
loss of his wife's society, care and comfort resulting from her death, in a common law
contract action against a physician for breach of his implied agreement to render
necessary and proper medical care to the wife. The court stated that elements of
damage arising from death were barred in contract actions, as well as tort actions, and
allowed the husband only damages for the wife's treatment. Sherlag v. Kelley, 200
Mass. 232, 86 N.E. 293, 19 L.R.A. 633 (1908).
In the Zostautas case Judge Solfisburg said: "This court has joined in the criticism
of that common law rule which apparently originated from a misreading of English
legal history and has refused to expand its corollaries, nevertheless, we do not believe
that a distinction should be made whereby the rule is invoked only in tort but not in
contract actions where the breach of contract causes death." (Citations omitted).
Thus it seems the court is unwilling to break with what it finds to be admittedly
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ill-founded precedent and maintains the course of inextricable confusion which
surrounds cases of this nature.
JOSEPH

Personal Property--Gifts-Copyright-Delivery

J. BAKER

of Future Profits.

Speelman v. Pascal, 10 N.Y. 2d 313, 178 N.E. 2d 723 (1961).
owned 98% of a corporation which, in turn, owned the
exclusive rights to compose and produce a musical version of Shaw's "Pygmalion."
Several months before his death, defendant's intestate signed and delivered to plaintiff a letter which purported "to confirm to you our understanding that I give you"
a certain percentage "from my share of the profits" in the musical. When the donor
died, not only had the play not been produced but no contract had been let with
suitable composers to write it. The donor's administrator, however, was successful in
letting such a contract pursuant to which a musical was written and produced. On
the question of whether a gift had been made, the court held there was a valid gift.
Speelman v. Pascal, 10 N.Y. 2d 313, 178 N.E. 2d 723 (1961).
The court in this case simply held the gift valid without stating the legal theory it
used as the basis of its holding. However, the court made reference to equitable assignments and deeds of gift. Perhaps the court could have said that the donor made
a gift of an undivided share of his license to use the play, thus holding that present
rights in existing property were the subject of the transfer. The court, nevertheless,
made it clear that the profits were given, and not a share of the license itself. The
court thus held that "prospective profits" of a non-existent play were given before
the contract to have the play written was completed; thus holding that present rights
in non-existent property were given.
The court enforced the donor's apparent intent but in so doing it held, in effect,
that non-existent property may be treated as property (by reason of the possibility
of its being realized), and, as such, it can be given in a court of equity. It has been
said, "'NemoDare Potest Quod Non Habet," that is, no man give that which he hath
not. Fleta, Lib. 3. C. 15 sec. 8 says: .'the subject of a gift must be certain" 2 Kent
Comm. 566, 13th Ed. "A gift cannot be made to take effect in the future" 12 R.C.L.
"Gifts" Sec. 9. It is with respect to these somewhat doctrinaire statements that this
case will be discussed. Equity will enforce an assignment of future property. The legal
reasoning supporting the transfer is that there is a present contract for the future
transaction, and equity demands an adequate consideration to support the present
DEFENDANT'S INTESTATE
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contract. Hite v. Hite, 120 Ohio St. 253, 166 N.E. 193 (1929), noted 28 Mich. L. Rev.
1058 (1930). The concept of equitable assignments, demanding consideration, would
be misapplied to gift cases; all the cases cited by the court for the proposition that
future property may be given, involved consideration, but there was none in this case.
A gift of a chattel inter vivos may be accomplished by a deed of gift without a
livery of the subject matter itself. See BROWN, THE LAW OF PERSONAL PROPERTY 131
(2d ed. 1955). The delivery of the deed is symbolic or constructive delivery of the
property. McGavic v. Cossum, 72 App. Div. 35, 76 N.Y. Supp. 305 (1902). The New
York courts take the liberal position, holding that an informal instrument i.e. without a seal, may be a valid deed of gift. Young v. Young, 80 N.Y. 422, 36 Am. Rep. 634
(1880), dictum, In Re Cohn 187 App. Div. 392, 178 N.Y. Supp. 225 (1919). "Where
a gift is evidenced by a writing rules as to delivery are somewhat relaxed." In Re
Brown's Ex'r, 130 Misc. 865, 226 N.Y. Supp. 1, 15 (1927). In the case at hand, the
question of whether non-existent property could be presently delivered became obscured when the court said that this variety of proprty (assuming that it was property)
could be delivered symbolicaly. The court's allusion to Farmers Loan and Trust Co.
v. Winthrop, 270 App. Div. 356, 202 N.Y. Supp. 456 mod. 238 N.Y. 477, 144 N.E. 686
(1924), as authority for the proposition that a symbolic delivery could be effected by a
strong expression of intent seems not only to be dictum but also inapplicable. That
case involved a gift of a power of attorney authorizing the donee to reduce to possession the subject matter of the gift. There Judge Cardozo said at page 487, "We assume
without deciding that such effect will be allowed if... there is an intention that the
title of the donor shall be divested and presently transferred." This case, the Speelman
case, involves the gift of something to which the donor had no title.
Whatever the method, when applied to gift cases, delivery would still seem to presuppose the existence of the property to be given. "Every species of property, if it is
in esse, may be the subject of a gift." 38 C.J.S. p. 808. A Kentucky case, Banks v.
Marksberry, 3 Littel 275 (1823) is said to be authority for the proposition that future
property may be the subject of a gift. This, however, is somewhat doubtful. There the
future offspring of a female slave were given by a father to his son, and the court said
that the blood relation of the father and the son was consideration for the future
transaction, implying that what had been accomplished was a covenant to stand
seised. "A gift is a present passing of title." BROWN, supra at 131. "A gift inter vivos
is a gift in praesenti, a consummated and completed act, and has no reference to past
or future events." In Re Birdsall's Estate, 22 Misc. 180, 49 N. Y. Supp. 450, 463 (1897).
The New York courts would seem to hold that property which is the subject of a
gift must be certain. In Re Delapenha'sEstate, 176 Misc. 732,28 N.Y. Supp. 2d 975,978
(1941). There it was said, "the thing given must be identified. A 'gift' unlike a will,
is never ambulatory. The definitely ascertained property passes at the time of donation." However, the Delapenha's case was not mentioned in the case of In Re
Roosevelt's Will, 73 N.Y. Supp. 2d 821 (1947). In the Roosevelt case Mr. Roosevelt's
papers were given to a library. Mr. Roosevelt gave an instrument said to be a 'deed'
to his papers, and manually delivered the papers in existence, prior to this "memoranda" of delivery. The question arose as to whether the "memoranda" covered
papers written after its delivery. There the court said (at page 826), "acceptance of a
gift need not be made immediately at the time of delivery. It is sufficient if the gift
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is accepted and the exercise by the donee of dominion over the subject of the gift or
the assertion of a right thereto by him is generally held to be evidence of his acceptance." The court there did not directly answer the question of what constitutes a
valid delivery. It seemed to suggest that a gift may be held in abeyance, and allow
addition or accumulations to the subject of the gift to which the donee may claim
title after some partial acknowledgement of ownership. The Roosevelt case would
seem to overrule the Delapenha's case; however the Roosevelt case cites no authority
whatsoever in the course of its opinion, and perhaps may be treated as a case sui
generis, due to the personalities involved.
The attempt to give that which was non-existent at the time when the transfer had
to take effect was a gift could only be of future profits, and thus no more than a
promise. In Re Birdsall'sEstate, ibid. "Until the donor has divested himself absolutely
and irrevocably of title, dominion, and control of the gift, he has the power to revoke,
and a court of equity will not compel him to complete his gift." Curry v. Powers,
70 N.Y. 212, 26 Am. Rep. 577 (1877) ; Lehr v. Jones, 74 App. Div. 54, 77 N.Y. Supp.
212 (1902) . Here the donor had no title to future profits. He had the rights to receive
the profits. Judge Page, dissenting in In Re Cohn, supra said at p. 231, "the intention
to give is often established by the most satisfactory evidence, although the gift fails.
Instruments may be ever so formally executed by the donor, purporting to transfer
title to the donee, or there may be the most explicit declaration of the intention to
give, or an actual present gift, yet, unless there is a delivery, the intention is defeated."
Young v. Young, ibid; Jackson v. Twenty-third St. Ry. Co., 88 N.Y. 520 (1882); In Re
Crawford, 113 N.Y. 560, 21 N.E. 692 (1889). The profits would accrue to the donor
by way of the license to use the play, and the production of the musical from it. It
would seem that the profits in question would have to come into existence, though
not necessarily possession, before they could be given; that is, profits and ownership
of them would then be ascertainable. One may give rights to presently existing
property, but the gift of present rights to future and unascertainable property has
not been recognized in the area of gifts until this case, which is a departure from the
traditional position.
The holding, that the intention to give property or to do an act combined with a
promise may create legally enforceable rights and duties, can have far-reaching consequences.
STEPHEN

B.

POTTER
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Security Transactions-Deeds of Trust-TrusteesConflict of Interests.
Sheridan v. Perpetual Building Association, 299 F. 2d 463 (D.C. App.

1962).
IN A DEED OF TRUST TRANSACTION involving Sheridan as the borrower and the Perpetual Building Association as the lender, the trustees named therein were officers
and directors of Perpetual. At a foreclosure sale after default, a bid sufficient to
release all parties from their obligations was made by a responsible party who later
rescinded. The trustees took no action against the purchaser, although, under the
conditions of the sale, the trustees could have resold at the cost and risk of the defaulting purchaser or availed themselves of any legal or equitable rights against him,
among these being specific performance in equity or damages at law. Instead, the
treasurer of Perpetual undertook to declare the purchaser's deposit forfeited and
released him from his bid.
A second foreclosure sale produced a lower bid than the first sale and resulted in a
deficiency for which Sheridan was held accountable by both the District and Circuit
courts. Upon rehearing in banc, the court reversed on the ground that the decision
made by the treasurer to release the defaulting purchaser from his bid appeared
"prima facie to have been a decision by and in the interest solely of the lender." The
case was remanded to the lower court for the determination as to whether a breach
of fiduciary obligation had in fact occurred. The court, in a footnote, expressed what
may put an end to the heretofore dubious union of creditor-dominated trustee and
lending institution: "... the rule [requiring a fiduciary with conflicting interests to
bear the burden of proving fidelity to the trust] applies wherever a trustee with conflicting interests takes action, such as foreclosure, seriously affecting the borrower's
interest. Substitution of independent trustees prior to the taking of any such action
would seem to offer a measure of protection to all concerned." Sheridan v. Perpeual
Building Association, 299 F. 2d 463 (D.C. App. 1962).
The past decisions of the District of Columbia courts dealing with the essential
problem in the Sheridan case appear to have reluctantly tolerated close economic
relations between trustees and the lending institutions rather than explicitly prohibiting such ties. The cases, in general, hold that economic ties with the lending
institutions do not, of themselves, disqualify a trustee or incapacitate him from fulfilling his duties; but a charge is cast upon the courts to scrutinize very closely all that
is done in the execution of the trust. Clark v. Trust Co., 100 U.S. 149 (1879) ; Realty
Investment & Securities Corp. v. Rust, 71 App. D.C. 213, 109 F.2d 456 (1939);
Canelacos v. Hollway, 75 U.S. App. D.C. 58, 123 F.2d 934 (1941); Alpar v. Perpetual
Building Association, 104 U.S. App. D.C. 341, 262 F.2d 230 (1959); Admiral Co. v.
Thomas, 106 U.S. App. D.C. 266, 271 F.2d 849 (1959).
However, there is affirmative duty to make a full disclosure of the relationship; and
the burden is upon the trustee to prove good faith. Holman v. Ryon, 61 App. D.C. 10,
56 F.2d 307 (1932) ; Spruill v. Ballard, 61 App. D.C. 112, 58 F.2d 517 (1932) ; Earl v.

1962]

Case Notes

Pickens, 72 U.S. App. D.C. 91, 113 F.2d 150 (1940); Realty Invest. & Sec. Corp. v.
Rust, supra; Canelacos v. Hollway, supra.
Admonishments have been issued by the court on a few occasions. They point out
the "impropriety of the exercise of a power of sale under a deed of trust by a trustee
who is, or is associated with, the owner of the debt secured." Canelacosv. Hollway,
supra, at 59. "The conflict between such a trustee's interest and his duty to the debtor
has led us to restrain such sales and substitute a disinterested trustee." Canelacos v.
Hollway, supra, at 59; Kent v. Livingstone, 65 App. D.C. 291, 83 F.2d 316 (1936);
Spruill v. Ballard, supra, at 114.
Prior to the nineteenth century, no mortgage was effective to transfer a title so as
to foreclose the owner's equity of redemption without the intervention of a court of
equity, even though the debtor, as he frequently did, agreed to such an arrangement.
Making the creditor the arbiter of his own case was looked upon, in the words of
Judge Cabell in Chowning v. Cox, 1 Randolph (22 Va.) 306, 312, 10 Am. Dec. 530
(1823) as "contrary to the clearest principles of justice"; for economic realities demonstrated that the "borrower is a slave to the lender."
By the latter part of the same century, an increasing number of courts permitted
the exercise of the power of sale by the creditor without the court's intervention,
assigning as their reasons the convenience of the creditor and the importance of the
freedom of contract. Thus, equity courts slowly retreated from their time-honored
position as the paladin of the borrower until the deed of trust arose as a happy compromise between rigid debtor protection and creditor convenience. The deed of trust
provides an inexpensive and expeditious method of satisfying debts on default of
payment and removes the necessity of the intervention of the courts. Nevertheless,
the courts, although recognizing its advantages, are also impressed by the precarious
position of the borrower in the very summary nature of the deed of trust. Undoubtedly, the relaxation in the deed of trust of the strict, uncompromising rule that equity
imposed upon a sale in the mortgage transaction is predicated upon the theory that
the trustee is a disinterested third party acting as a fiduciary agent of the debtor and
creditor, thus removing any opportunity for oppression by the creditor and assuring
fair treatment to the debtor. The keystone to the proper functioning of the deed of
trust, therefore, is the disinterestedness of the trustee.
In theory, the disinterestedness would best be protected by completely prohibiting
officers and employees of lending institutions from acting as trustees under deeds of
trust involving the lending institution with which they are affiliated. Thus, the borrower would receive the ultimate in protection. Yet, in practice, such prohibition
would emasculate the deed of trust of its inherent advantage to the creditor in that
valuable time, effort, and greater expenses would be involved in procuring, if at all
possible, totally disinterested trustees for all their deed of trust transactions. Since
securing loans by deeds of trust is the most prevalent if not universal method in effect
in the District of Columbia, the additional problems resulting would be multifarious
and complex.
To insinuate that the lending institutions are engaged in a nefarious scheme to
exploit the public would certainly be a grave injustice to them. Without a doubt, the
lending institutions of the District of Columbia have exhibited the utmost candor
and honesty in their loan transactions. The practice of utilizing employees as trustees
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has its merits in the eyes of the lenders in keeping policies flexible, expenses at an
unoppressive level (which saving is passed on to the borrower), and the trustee
present at a moment's notice. Yet, as the court pointed out in the Sheridan case, such
practice is "subject to suspicion and criticism." The keystone of the deed of trust's
proper functioning has been annihilated. To contend that such a trustee is a disinterested party and not subject to creditor influence is "to indulge a credulity in the
disinterestedness of human nature which experience does not justify." Spruill v.
Ballard, supra, at 114. The law cannot accurately measure the influence of a trustee
with his associates.
Trustees named in a deed of trust

"...

sustain a fiduciary relationship to the debtor

as well as the creditor" Church v. Holmes, 60 App. D.C. 27, 46 F.2d 608 (1931) ;
Holman v. Ryon, supra, at 13; Spruill v. Ballard, supra, at 114; "... should be impartial and above suspicion" Sheridan v. PerpetualBuilding Assoc., supra; ". . . should
scrupulously avoid placing [themselves] in a position where their interests might
conflict with the interests of those whom [they] represent." Holman v. Ryon, supra,
at 13; "...

upon a showing of interest ... ought not to be permitted to continue

serve." Kent v. Livingstone, supra, at 291; Canelacos v. Hollway, supra,at 59.
Whether the lending institutions' present altruisitic policy is based upon morals,
business necessities or public relations, the fact remains that the human element is
involved and "considering that human nature must be dealt with, the rule [inhibiting
a fiduciary from assuming antagonistic positions to his principal in matters involving
the subject matter of the trust] does not stop with actual violations of such trust
relations, but includes within its purpose the removal of any temptation to violate
them." U.S. v. Mississippi Valley GeneratingCo., 364 U.S. 520, 550.
The determinative factor upon which the courts have relied in the past is the
disclosure or non-disclosure of the relationship between the trustee and the lender.
However, note Judge Bazelon's concurring opinion in the Admiral case, supra, at
268, ". . disclosure of trustee's dual capacity is not meaningful if, in reality, the
borrower must accept him in order to obtain the loan." [Italics mine.]
The court, in the Sheridan case, appears to have reached the limit of its remedial
powers in dealing with creditor-dominated trustees by casting upon them the burden
of proving good faith and by suggesting the substitution of independent trustees
prior to the taking of any action affecting the borrower's interest. Perhaps the ultimate answer which would both insure the borrower's position and retain the convenience and expeditiousness of the deed of trust for the lender lies in the solution
evolved by several state legislatures (See, e.g., Colorado Revised Statutes [1953],
18-3-1) whereby an office of public trustee is created. Such officer is to be named in all
deeds of trust as the trustee. Failure to do so would result in foreclosure through the
courts.
What effect the Sheridan case will have upon the lending institutions and their
policies toward their trustees remains to be seen. At present, the indication is that
they will perhaps employ more propriety in the selection of trustees in order to avoid
the bad public relations resulting from the court's chastisement.
JOHN S. CASTELLANO

